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Deducing Budgetary Priorities in Saudi Arabia: The Impact of 
Defense Expenditures on Allocations to socio-Economic Programs 
Introduction 
by 
Robert E. Looney 
Professor, National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 USA 
The 1990 Saudi budget, set at just over that for 1989, and the 
1990-95 five year plan, with spending targets on the current price 
equivalent of five times the 1990 budgetary figure, indicate fairly 
clearly that Saudi Arabia's days of priming the non-oil economy are 
essentially over, but that its commitment to price stability 
remains [Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990, p.4]. 
The five year plan has proposed growth targets averaging 3.2 
percent a year between 1990 and 1995, roughly in line with what 
might be expected to be the population growth rate. The oil sector 
is expected to grow at a real rate of 2.7 percent a year, but the 
oil and gas sector combined by only 2.2 percent. The domestic non-
oil economy is expected to grow at 3.6 percent. The overall growth 
rate in the non-oil sectors is likely to improve when the 
contraction in government services has flattened out. 
over the medium term, the plan's spending targets suggest a 
very heavy bias towards defense, social services, and subsidies, 
with extra revenue to be used to rebuild reserves. As with the 
1989 budget, the government's 1990 spending plans anticipate that 
increased overall revenues would reduce.the government's borrowing 
needs, eliminating the necessity for any further reductions in the 
country's foreign reserves. 
The intention of the budget is to increase the already large 
human resources development. To meet this objective, reductions in 
funding must be made in most other sectors. However, these cuts 
have been minimized in the areas of defense, administration, health 
and social development. The local subsidies section of the budget 
has been kept unchanged largely for political reasons to reflect 
King Fahd's promise to protect the living standards of low income 
Saudis [Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990, p.4]. 
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While the picture for human resources looks promising, what is 
the chance that allocations to this sector will begin to expand 
again? The purpose of this paper is to assess in some detail, 
based on past budgetary patterns, the manner in which the 
government tends to revise its actual budgetary expenditures in 
response to revenue developments during the fiscal year. Do 
expenditures on human resources vary systematically with unexpected 
changes in revenues? Does the human resource share of the budget 
expand or contract systematically with movements in any of the 
other major budgetary categories? Do defense expenditures come at 
the expense of social or economic (or both) budgetary allocations? 
Fiscal Patterns 
Budgetary revenue and expenditures [Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 1988] increased steadily to 1974, except for 1967/68 when 
dislocation following the Israeli-Arab war affected all economies 
in the region. However, the 1973/74 and 1979 oil price jumps, 
world recession, fluctuations in the world demand for oil, and 
political instability and warfare in the Gulf have led to sizeable 
year to year fluctuations in budgetary receipts compared to 
expectations. 
Although the general trend remained buoyant until 1981/82, in 
1977/78 and 1978/79 slight budget deficits followed unexpectedly 
low oil revenues, whereas expenditure and revenue both rose higher 
than projected during the next two years. The 1982/83 budget was 
the first in which an absolute decline in revenue was projected, 
the objective being to arrive at a balance, while in 1983/84 a 
planned deficit of SR35 billion was budgeted for the first time in 
recent history. 
In 1984/85, the planned deficit was increased to SR46 billion 
(Table 1) with budget revenue and expenditure figures SR214 billion 
and SR260 billion respectively. The 1985/86 budget was supposed to 
balance at SR200 billion, but ended with a SR50 billion deficit. 
The 1986/87 budget was not published in March 1986 as due, because 
of uncertain revenue forecasts. Monthly disbursements continued on 
the basis of average spending in 1984/85. A new budget was finally 
released at the end of December 1986 to cover the 1987 calendar 
year. This budget projected revenue at SR117 billion, compared 
with SR340 billion envisaged in the budget for 1981/82. 
Over the same period, the government had reduced government 
spending from SR298 billion to SR160 billion, a significant 
achievement, but not enough to close the deficit gap. In 1988, 
another large budget deficit was projected but the government 
acknowledged the dwindling size of its budget reserves by launching 
a local borrowing scheme to cover a substantial portion of the 
revenue shortfall. Import duties were also raised in an attempt to 
generate more non-oil revenue, but other measures such as tax 
increases were rescinded following public protest. 
As well as declining oil revenues, the government has had to 
contend with a drop in ov~rseas investment income, which has 
resulted from a fall in international interest rates and a 
reduction in the size of the government's overseas assets from 
around $150 billion in 1982 to less (estimated) than $60 billion by 
the end of 1988 [Richie, 1987, p. 169]. 
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Table 1 
Saudi Arabia: Government Budget Estimates, 1984-1988 
(SR million) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Total Revenue 225,00 214,000 200,000 106,926 105,300 
Oil Revenue 164,496 164,500 154,250 74,183 73,525 
Other Revenue 60,504 49,600 45,750 32,743 31,775 
Balance -35,000 -45,900 -52,720 -35,900 
Borrowing 30,000 
source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various 
issues. 
One of the main problems for the government is that current 
expenditure has proved very difficult to pare back; there are huge 
costs involved in running and maintaining the activities 
established by development project capital inputs--in social 
services as well as physical infrastructure. Defense expenditure 
remains a major budget item. 
In terms of recently released figures, in 1986 (March-
December), actual domestic revenue was only SR16.5 billion, 
government domestic spending was SR88. 2 billion, and government 
direct foreign exchange spending was SR37.6 billion. By the end of 
1987 central government reserve accounts lodged with SAMA had 
fallen to SR78 billion, down from SR118.5 billion at the end of 
1986. This SR40.5 billion drop probably reflects fairly accurately 
the actual size of the 1987 budget deficit, against a budgeted 
SR52.7 billion. If the budgeted 1988 deficit of SR36 billion had 
been fully financed from reserves rather than borrowing, these 
government deposits might have been halved by the end of 1988 to 
less than $10 billion. 
The growing government preoccupation with cutting its budget 
deficit is being translated into a number of schemes devised to tap 
the savings of state organizations (the Pension Fund has around 
SR60 billion) and the private sector. Expenditure rationalization 
and efficiency increases have also been attempted but are proving 
elusive targets. 
Government bond issues are the most obvious example of 
attempts to tap sources of savings other than the government's own 
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dwindling reserves, the more so since various amendments to the 
offering terms have been introduced. These changes have gradually 
widened the groups of potential end-investors. Before the bonds 
were even offered to banks, it is estimated that some SR14 billion 
may have been placed with the government Pension Fund. The bonds 
were then offered to banks, some of which gained permission to 
place them in a package of national assets offered to private 
investors in the form of a unit trust. 
Finally, towards the end of September 1988 the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) announced that banks would be able to sell 
the bonds directly to the Saudi public in minimum tranches of SRl 
million; purchasers would get a certificate of purchase rather than 
the bonds themselves as the banks would still collect interest from 
them, and would be forbidden to sell them to non-Saudis. Firm 
details on the number and success of the bond offerings are sparse, 
which seems to confirm both that the banks' take has been lower 
than hoped for, and that the scheme itself is still seen as rather 
controversial. 
The success of the government borrowing program will be judged 
not just by the levels of commercial bank and private sector 
subscriptions to trance issue, but also by the extent to which 
these investors are prepared to repatriate funds from abroad to 
purchase the bonds. As yet there is no firm evidence to show 
whether the purchases are being financed from domestic or foreign 
savings. 
Figures released published by the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency [1987] provide an insight into the extent of the 
government's problem, and the nature of commercial banks' net 
foreign asset position. In the ten month interval between budgets 
in 1986, direct government foreign exchange spending stood at 
SR37. 6 billion, domestic spending at SR88. 2 billion, domestic 
revenue at SR16.5 billion, and net domestic cash flows (defined as 
domestic spending minus domestic revenues) at SR71.7 billion. If 
the government could cover its direct foreign exchange spending 
with foreign currency repatriated via the bond issues, it would 
mean that government oil revenue and overseas investment income 
could all be put at the disposal of SAMA to meet private sector 
foreign exchange demand. 
On the other hand, if government borrowings are to be covered 
by riyal savings, and could therefore be classified in the same 
vein as domestic revenue, it becomes clear that this method of 
borrowing will decrease the net domestic cash flow, along with the 
stimulus that the government budget has traditionally given to the 
economy. This might be expected eventually to lead to less demand 
for foreign exchange throughout the economy, rather than an 
increase in foreign exchange availability. Funding the bond issues 
from domestic resources thus has a much clearer deflationary 
impact, which might be expected to hurt the independent growth of 
the private sector. 
As far as the commercial banks are concerned, the true extent 
of their net foreign assets position is often overstated, by a 
tendency not to net out residents' foreign currency deposits and 
not to take into account the extent of foreign assets denominated 
in Saudi riyals. In mid-1987 when Saudi commercial banks' foreign 
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assets were standing at SR88.6 billion and foreign liabilities at 
SR16.8 billion, giving a net foreign asset position of SR71.8 
billion, the banks were also holding SR28 billion in residents' 
foreign currency deposits, while their net foreign position in 
Saudi riyals was SR20.6 billion. In other words, their true net 
foreign assets position could be more correctly stated at only 
SR23. 2 billion. 
The figure for the size of the offshore riyal market is only 
reported by the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency [1988], but it might 
be assumed to have grown in 1987/88 following the removal of 
withholding tax. Assuming the net figure for this market has not 
risen to SR25 billion, a truer net foreign asset figure for Saudi 
commercial banks would seem to be SR17.7 billion--insufficient to 
cover more than half the planned 1988 budget deficit. It is clear, 
then, that the commercial banks alone cannot be expected to cover 
the budget deficit in foreign currency, or at least not until a 
clearer line of the riyal persuades local depositors to switch out 
of foreign currency deposits. 
The government will undoubtedly have great difficulties in 
raising sufficient funds to continue expenditures at recent levels. 
Other methods, expenditure reductions and/or redirection seem more 
realistic solutions to the country's budgetary problems. 
Budgetary Priorities 
In recent years, almost all the major categories of the budget 
have been cut (Table 2) • Infrastructure spending in particular has 
been cut drastically, with few new projects commissioned. The 
budget for education and health has also been cut, reflecting in 
part a decline in capital expenditure on new schools and hospitals. 
The wage bill for teachers, nurses and doctors continues to rise, 
however. Similar conditions arise with defense expenditures, as 
basic defense infrastructure is past its peak, the need to purchase 
new equipment and re-equip is greater than ever [Wilson, 1987, 
p.93]. 
In terms of specific allocations (Table 2): 
1. Government lending institutions have experienced the' 
greatest reduction in their allocations, declining by 51.9 
percent over the 1983/88 period, and with cutbacks 
accelerating to 67. 5 percent for the more recent 1985/88 
period. 
2. After expanding at an average rate of 20.6 percent over 
the period following the second oil price increase (1980-82), 
human resource development averaged reductions of 5.8 and 8.0 
percent per annum over the 1983-88 and 1985-88 period 
respectively. It appears, however, that of the major 
budgetary categories, human resource development experienced 
the smallest cutbacks during both the 1983/88 period and over 
the 1985/88 period. 
3. Despite the common perception of their high priority, 
defense expenditures contracted at a the fairly rapid rate of 




Saudi Arabia: Central Government Budqetary Expenditures: 1980-88 
(billions of Saudi Riyals) 
Averaqe Annual 
Rate of Growth 
1980/ 1983/ 1985/ 
cateqory 1980 1983 1985 1988 1983 1988 1988 
Human Resource 18.2 31.9 30.4 23.7 20.6 -5.8 -8.0 
Development 
Transportation & 24.4 32.5 22.2 10.9 10.0 -6.l -21.l 
Communications 
Economic 14.9 22.0 12.5 5.9 13.9 -23.l -22.l 
Resource Dev 
Health 9.8 17.0 16.l 10.8 20.2 -8.7 -28.5 
Infrastructure 6.9 11. 7 9.8 3.6 19.3 -21.0 -28.4 
Municipal 12.7 26.2 17.l 7.0 27.3 -23.3 -25.7 
Services 
Defense 56.5 92.9 79.9 50.1 18.0 -11.6 -14.4 
Pub Administ 48.0 44.6 43.9 25.l - 2.4 -10.9 -17.0 
Govt Lendinq 24.8 23.4 17.5 0.6 
- 1.9 -51.9 -67.5 
Institutions 
Local Subsidies o.o 11.2 10.5 5.3 -13.9 -20.4 
Notes: Based on data from: Saudi Arabian Monetary Aqency, Annual 
Report, various issues. 
4. The same also applies to local subsidies which have 
declined at 13.9 and 20.4 percent per annum during the 1983/88 
and 1985/88 periods respectively. 
As a result of these differential rates of contraction, the 
relative shares of the major expenditure items have undergone a 
fairly large realignment (Table 3). 
l. There has been a major increase in human resource 
development, from 8.5 percent of government expenditures in 
1980 to 16.6 percent in 1988. Again this increase reflects 
the contraction of human resource expenditures at a rate 
considerably less than that experienced by other major 
categories. 
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Table 3 
Saudi Arabia: composition of Central Government Budqet 1980-88 
(percent of Central Government Expenditures) 
category 1980 1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Human Resource 8.5 8.8 10.7 11. 7 12.3 14.8 16.6 
Development 
Transportation 11.3 11.9 9.6 8.5 7.2 6.8 6.7 
& Communications 
Econprtiic 6.9 7.6 5.1 4.8 4.5 4.1 4.2 
Resource Dev 
Health 4.6 4.6 5.2 6.2 6.4 7.0 7.7 
Infrastructure 3.1 4.7 3.7 3.8 3.5 2.7 2.5 
Municipal 5.9 8.8 7.3 6.6 5.9 5.1 5.0 
Services 
Defense 26.l 27.7 29.0 30.7 32.0 34.0 35.5 
Pub Admin 22.2 14.4 18.2 16.9 19.8 19.4 17.8 
Govt Lending 11.5 8.3 7.7 6.7 4.7 2.2 0.4 
Institutions 
Local Subsidies 0.0 3.1 3.5 4.1 4.2 3.9 3.8 
Notes: Based on data from: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual 
Report, various issues. 
2.' Defense expenditures have maintained their dominant 
position, increasinq from around twenty six percent of the 
budget in 1980 to over thirty five percent by 1988. 
3. Government lending institutions have experienced a dramatic 
decrease in importance, experiencing a decline in their share 
of qovernment expenditure from over 11 percent in 1980 to less 
than half a percent by 1988. 
4. Infrastructure expenditures in 1988 were about one half 
their 1983 share. 
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5. A similar percentage-wise decline was experienced by 
transportation and communications. 
Human resource expenditures have enabled the country to 
achieve significant increases in both enrollment rates and teacher 
student ratios. Although the country lags somewhat behind 
comparable countries in terms of enrollment rates, it appears to be 
closing the gap fairly quickly (Table 4). In addition, the pupil 
teacher ratio is one of the lower ones for countries of Saudi 
Arabia's level of development. 
On the other hand, the relatively low number of pupils 
reaching the sixth grade indicates that a number of difficulties 
exist in terms of the quality of education received. It is clear 
that the country has made some great strides in its efforts to 
increase the kingdom's stock of human capital. However, it is just 
as apparent that a great deal more needs to be accomplished. 
In this regard, it is of some interest to examine the degree 
of commitment made by the government to developing the country's 
human assets. The evolving budgetary patterns examined above are 
suggestive of the manner in which the Saudi government prioritizes 
its expenditures. However, simple changes in the relative growth of 
sectoral budgetary allocations (or their share of the total) while 
suggestive, are not sufficient in and of themselves to infer the 
existence of any major commitment on part of the government to 
certain expenditure categories over others. 
A more indicative measure would be to determine the manner in 
which windfall revenues, gains and losses are allocated. More 
specifically, how do shortfalls (or surpluses) from the previous 
fiscal year affect the share of fund·s allocated to a specific 
sector this year? If the Saudis approach their budget process 
through some form of lexicog~aphic ordering of budgetary 
priorities, then sectors with high priorities would be relatively 
protected from budgetary cuts. In contrast, these sectors would not 
be the major beneficiaries of unanticipated windfalls. 
This would be especially true in the case of unexpected 
surplus or deficit in the government's fiscal accounts. For 
example, if the authorities feel that human resources have a high 
priority, then activities of this type would be sure to be funded 
up to a certain point, irrespective of the effect this funding had 
on other (lower priority) activities. To preserve this level of 
funding during periods of unanticipated revenue shortfalls, the 
government would cut back on other activities in the next fiscal 
year (thus increasing the share of funds allocated to human 
resource activities). On the other hand, excess funds or 
unanticipated windfalls would go to fund marginally important 
activities, thus reducing the share of human resources in the 
budget. 
The model used to test this theory of Saudi budgetary behavior 
implicitly assumes that the authorities adjust the human resource 
share of the budget to short run developments in the country's 
fiscal accounts to maintain a relatively constant level of real 
resources devoted to human resource development. The specific 
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Table 4 
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resource development to developments in the prior fiscal year and 
the share of other sectoral allocations: 
EDU= [UFS(-) 1 EFS(-), OE(?)] 
EDU = the share of government expenditures budgeted for human 
resource development. 
UFS the share of unexpected fiscal surplus from the prior year. 
EFS the share of expected fiscal surplus from the prior year. 
OE = the share of government expenditure budgeted for other 
activities. 
Here: 
~·The.expected fiscal surplus (deficit) from the prior year 
is defined as the expected level of government revenues minus 
its budgeted level of expenditures. 
2. The unexpected fiscal surplus (deficit) for the prior year 
is defined as the actual surplus (deficit) minus the budgeted 
surplus (deficit) surplus. 
The results for the period 1979-88 produced several 
interesting findings (Table 5): 
1. Both the lagged unexpected fiscal surplus and the lagged 
expected fiscal surplus were highly significant in effecting 
the share of government expenditures budgeted for human 
resource development during this period. Put differently, the 
larger each of these surpluses in the previous year, the 
greater the share of funds budgeted to human resource 
development in the current fiscal year. 
2. Based on the size of the coefficients, unanticipated 
deficits appear about twice as strong as anticipated deficits 
in increasing the human resource component of the current 
year's budget. This result is consistent with the 
lexicographic ordering model hypothesized above. 
3. In terms of potential tradeoffs with other sectors, it 
appears that: (a) economic resources and defense expand or 
contract somewhat in line with human resources. on the other 
hand, human resource development has a negative tradeoff with 
funds allocated to: (a) public administration and (b) 
government lending institutions. 
4. No apparent budgetary patterns exist between human resource 
development and funds allocated to: (a) transportation and 
communication (b) health, (c) infrastructure, (d) municipal 
services, and (e) local subsidies. 
In general, the results of the model confirm the high priority 
granted human resource development by the Saudi authorities. 
Resources to this sector have been preserved relative to other 
sectors during the current period of austerity. Budgetary cuts 
have occurred in Saudi Arabia but education has been relatively 
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Table S 
Saudi Arabia: Budgetary 
Tradeoffs, Total Education (1979-1988) 
Lagged unexpected Fiscal surplus (OFS) 
1. EDU 0.10 UFS 
(-10.18) 
RHO - 0.49; t = - 1.60 r2 = 0.945; F 
Lagged Expected Fiscal surplus (EFS) 
2. EDU 0.09 UFS - 0.05 EFS 
(-18.21) (-6.59) 
RHO = - 0.15, t = - 0.42 r2 = o.988; F 
Transportation and communications (TC) 
3. EDU= - 0.11 UFS - 0.05 EFS - 0.21 TC 
(-6.75) (-7.00) (1.17) 
RHO = - 1.10, t = - 0.30 r2 0.991; 
Economic Resource Development (ERD) 
4. EDU = - 0.11 UFS - 0.05 EFS + 0.35 ERO 




141. O; ow 
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- 1. 71 
2.18 
3.08 
RHO = - 0.06,_ t = - 0.17; r2 0.994; F 239.50; ow 3.47 
Defense Expenditures (DE) 
5. EDU= - 0.05 UFS - 0.03 EFS + 0.43 DE 
(-2.43) (-2.61) (1. 99) 
RHO 0.16, t = - 0.47; r2 = 0.994; F 233.60; ow 1.89 
Health Expenditures (HE) 
6. EDU 0.07 UFS - 0.03 EFS + 0.58 HE 
(-3.30) (-2.40) (0.93) 
RHO - 0.10, t = - 0.30; r2 = 0.990; F 243.96; ow 1.46 
Notes: ·.Based on data from: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual 
Report, various issues. r2 = coefficient of determination, F = F 
statistic, OW = Durbin Watson Statistic; RHO = serial correlation 




Table 5 (contd) 
Saudi Arabia: Budqetary 
Tradeoffs, Total Education (1979-1988) 
Infrastructure (INF) 
7. EDU= - 0.09 UFS - 0.05 EFS - 0.16 INF 
(-2.87) (-4.88) (-0.16) 
RHO= - 0.15; t = - 0.43 r2 
Municipalities (MUN) 
0.989; F 
8. EDU = - 0.12 UFS - 0.06 EFS 
(-7.68) (-4.65) 
RHO 0.26, t = - 0.76 r2 
Public Administration (ADM) 
9. EDU 0.06 UFS - 0.03 EFS 
(-4.68) (-3.46) 
RHO = 
- 0.75, t 0.73 r2 
Government Lendinq Institutions 
10.EDU = - 0.06 UFS 
- 0.03 EFS (-4.68) (-3.46) 
RHO = - 0.26, t = - 0.75; r2 
Local Subsidies (LS) 
11. EDU = 
- 0.19 UFS 
- 0.04 EFS (-10.49) (-5.78) 
+ 0.49 MUN 
(1. 53) 
0.993; F 




- 0.31 GLI 
(-2.40) 
0.996; F 
- O.LS DE 
(-0.86) 
115.23 ow 











Notes: Base~ on ?ata from: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Repo~t,,various issu~s. r2 =coefficient of determination F = F ~tatistic, DW := Durbin W~tson statistic; RHO = serial corr~lation. 
erm.d_All variables are in percentaqes of total central government 
expen itures. 
sp~red. The ~onq term n~ture of the commitment by the government to 
this sector is a~so e~idenced by the fact that it receives little 
in the way of quick fixes from short-run windfalls. · 
to b However'. given the fact that defense expenditures have managed 
e relatively stable, given the degree of contraction in 
~overnment ~xpenditures following the 1982 oil price collapse it ~s of some interest to determine which socio-economic catego~ies 
ave suffered as a result of the government's commitment to th 
ctountry•s security. To identify these tradeoffs, a model simila~ 
o the one developed above was tested. 
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SHARE= [DEFENSE(?), AFB(+), UFS(?)] 
SHARE = the share of government expenditures budgeted for major 
categories of expenditure. 
AFS the actual fiscal surplus (as a share of government 
expenditures) during the current budgetary year. 
UFS = the unexpected fiscal surplus (as a share of government 
expenditure) during the current budgetary year. The unexpected 
fiscal surplus is defined as the differences between actual 
revenues and expenditures and budgeted revenues and expenditures. 
This formulation allows us to determine the direct tradeoff 
between defense expenditures and other budgetary categories, while 
at the same time controlling for any possible austerity affects 
associated with the government's short run fiscal position. 
The results for the period 1979-88 produced several additional 
findings of interest (Tables 6, 7): 
1. Using the shorter run specification, defense expenditures 
appear to be quite complementary with increased allocations to 
human resource development (Equation 1, Table 6). In fact, of 
the various government budgetary categories, the link to human 
resource developments was the strongest associated with 
defense expenditures. 
2. Defense expenditures were also complementary with 
allocations to health (Equation 3, Table 6). 
3. The major negative budgetary tradeoffs involving defense 
were concentrated in the economic areas: (a) transportation 
and communications, (2) economic resource development and, to 
a much lesser extent, (3) infrastructure. 
4. Defense expenditures also tended to come at the expense of 
a number of administrative allocations including (a) payments 
to municipalities, (b) subsidies for government lending 
institutions. 
5. On the other hand areas such as general administration and 
the direct government subsidies program (largely for 
agriculture) did not suffer a reduction in their relative 
share of the government budget stemming from the government's 
commitment to high levels of military expenditures. 
conclusions 
As a result of the Gulf War and increasing worries concerning 
internal security, itmight correctly assumed that defense spending 
would be a higher priority than ever before in Saudi Arabia. While 
defense has retained its leading share of the budget during the 
recent period of relative fiscal austerity, the country does not 
appear to have fallen into a guns vs education syndrome. In fact, 
the two types of expenditure appear to complement each other in the 
minds of the Saudi budgetary authorities. 
The country appears firmly committed to its responsibility of 
providing educational opportunities to the majority of its 
324 
Table 6 
Saudi Arabia: Budgetary Tradeoffs Involving 
Defense, social and Economic Allocations, (1979-1988) 
(two stage least squares estimates) 
Human Resource Development (HRD) 
1. HRD = 0.91 DEFENSE + 0.01 DEFU 
(14.16) (0.66) 
RHO - 0.23; t 
- 0.49 r2 = 0.981; 
Transportation and Communication (TC) 
2. TC = - 1.10 DEFENSE + 0.08 DEFU 
(-3.79) (1.68) 
RHO 0.15, t = 0.25; r2 = 0.844; OW 
Health (HE) 
3. HE = 0.33 DEFENSE - 0.01 DEFA 
(2.81) (-0.51) 
RHO 0.63, t 0.11; r2 = 0.947; ow 
Economic Resource Development (ECON) 
4. ECON = = 0.82 DEFENSE + 0.07 DEFU 
(-2.23) (1.16) 
RHO 0.11; t = 0.18; r2 = 0.554; ow 
Infrastructure (INFR) 
5. INFR = - 0.22 DEFENSE 
(-0.81) 






RHO = 1.00, t = 2.60; r2 = 0.866; ow= 3.41 
2.41 
LOONEY 
Notes: Based on data from: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual 
Report, various issues. r2 = coefficient of determination F = F 
statistic, OW = Durbin Watson Statistic; RHO = serial corr~lation 
term. All variables are in percentages of total central government 
expenditures. 
Estimates were made using a two-state least squares estimation 
technique incorporating the HILU method of correction for first 
order autocorrelated errors. DEFU =the unexpected fiscal deficit 
(as a percentage of budgeted expenditures) DEFA = the actual fiscal 
deficit (as a percentaged of budgeted expenditures) 
BUDGETARY PRIORITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA 
Table 7 
Saudi Arabia: Budgetary 
Tradeoffs Involving Subsidies and Defense, (1979-1988) 
(two stage least squares estimates) 
Municipalities (MUNIC) 
1. MUNIC = - 0.81 DEFENSE + 0.03 DEFU 
(-2.67) (0.78) 
RHO= 0.34, t = 0.78; r2 = 0.706; DW = 2.81 
Government Lendinq Institutions (GOVTLEN) 
2. GOVTLEN 1.68 DEFENSE - 0.07 DEFA 
(-7.65) (-3.41) 
RHO= - 0.75, t = -1.27; r2 = 0.986; OW 2.37 
Government Subsidies (GSUB) 
3. GSUB = 0.26 DEFENSE - 0.04 DEFU 
2.61) (-2.24) 
RHO= 0.05, t = 0.03; r2 = 0.760; OW 2.84 
Administration (ADMIN) 
4. ADMIN = 1.17 DEFENSE - 0.08 DEFU 
(2.48) (-0.86) 
RHO 0.03; t = 0.06; r2 = 0.599; DW 3.22 
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Notes: Based on data from: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual 
Report, various issues. r2 = coefficient of determination, F = F 
statistic, OW = Durbin Watson Statistic: RHO = serial correlation 
term. All variables are in percentages of total central government 
expenditures. 
Estimates were made using a two-state least squares estimation 
technique incorporating the HILU method of correction for first 
order autocorrelated errors. DEFU = the unexpected fiscal deficit 
(as a percentage of budgeted expenditures) DEFA = the actual fiscal 
deficit (as a percentaged of budgeted expenditures) 
326 LOONEY 
citizens. There is little reason to believe this conunitment will be 
sacrificed for the sake of maintaining foreign reserves. Apparently 
the government takes a longer term view in which the rate of return 
on its citizens is higher than the financial return on its foreign 
savings. 
REFERENCES 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Saudi Arabia Country Report No.l. 1990 
(London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990), p. 4. 
Richie, Michael. "Saudi Arabia" in Middle East Review. 1987 
(London: World of Information, 1987), pp. 167-83. 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Annual Report. 1987 (Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency, 1987). 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. Annual Report. 1988 (Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia, 1988). 
Wilson, Rodney. Gulf Trade and Finance Trends and Market Prospects 
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1987). 
World Bank. Social Indicators of Develonment, 1988 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 209. 
